4: Allen H-4 (no date) 1941 RD1 Ukraine RD1



1934, and in January of the following year it proclaimed its political and social victory. Reference has been made in the preceding chapter to the social upheaval, the great losses in human life and the redistribution of population incurred during the 'Revolution against the Peasants'. Losses in natural wealth were also formidable: during the five years, 1929–34, horses declined by 50 per cent; cattle by 40 per cent; only about half the total number of pigs survived and one-quarter of the sheep.

The first efforts of the Soviet administration had been directed to the organization of *Sovkhozy*—the large Government farms which in effect replaced the 'capitalist' private estates of the pre-Revolutionary period. Grain, beet sugar and stock-raising *Sovkhozy* were set up. In 1934 there were already 10,500 of them, of which 1665 were situated in the Ukraine and New Russia. In 1935 the sown area of the *Sovkhozy* attained 15 million hectares as against 2 million in 1929 (i.e. 10 per cent as against 2 per cent of the whole sown area of the Union). Livestock confiscated from the peasantry stocked these 'model' farms, which soon began to evoke the admiration of urban tourists from the West. The *Sovkhozy* were well supplied with the most modern agricultural machinery: in spite or because of this fact they failed to absorb any large proportion of the rural labour which had been deprived of normal occupation by the new measures. In 1931 only 1½ million people throughout the whole stretch of the Union were employed on *Sovkhozy*: in 1934 nearly 3 million were employed (of which 1½ million were in Ukraine and New Russia).

The *Kolkhozy* proved to be a far more important factor in the new agricultural economy. Between 1929 and 1934 all means—including the most ruthless—were employed to force the peasants on to the collective farms. The number of *Kolkhozy* grew rapidly: in July 1930 only 23 per cent of all farms had been converted into *Kolkhozy*; by the beginning of 1932 the figure was already 60 per cent; by the beginning of 1934 it had reached 72 per cent; and in 1936, 90 per cent. During the last three years individual farmers in U.S.S.R. have almost completely disappeared: the sown area occupied by private farmers amounted to 34 per cent in 1934 and to only 4 per cent in 1936.

As a result of the widespread famine conditions and the really serious insurrections which had troubled the authorities in the Northern Caucasus and Trans-Caucasia during the period 1930–32, and as a result also of the deterioration in the international situation which followed the Nazi rise to power in Germany in 1934, the Soviet Government, in spite of its proclaimed 'victory', found itself forced to modify the principles on which rural collectivization

185 474 241 The peasants also revived and breathed new life into the co-operatives which had been broken up during the period of Militant Communism. In 1923 they established another cooperative organization, the Selo-Tekhnyka (Village Machines) which purchased more expensive agricultural machinery and rented it out to the peasants for the appropriate agricultural work. These points became the centre of mechanization and were in effect the first [453] tractor stations. In 1924 they established the First Agricultural Bank, a sort of private institution which at one time had more loans outstanding than had the Ukrainian State Bank which was, of course, closely supervised by Moscow.

185 369 All these efforts[1] met with marked success and agriculture speedily began to revive. The peasants became more prosperous and their holdings of livestock rapidly increased, although they did not reach the pre-war level. This, in its turn, created a new demand for manufactured products and restored the factories to operation, and with them the conditions in the cities began to improve.

185 471 [475] Similar concessions were made to industry, but with one important difference. The larger and more important industrial plants were not turned back to their former owners who were, as before, allowed no voice or influence in their direction. They were taken from the workers who had seized and abused them during the period of Militant Communism and placed under the supervision of government trusts. These were either regional in character or confined to a single branch of industry. In either case, they were under the control of a more or less trusted group of men among whom Communists were in the leading positions, but while they received certain credits from the state, they were more or less autonomous and they were allowed to go through regular commercial transactions and encouraged to show profits in their annual reports. There was thus again a source of encouragement both for the directors and the workers, and slowly but surely the level of industry began to rise.

The smaller plants were very often leased to individuals who were allowed to employ hired labor and the hope was given to these that their taxes would be at such a level that they, too, could

[1] [NEP attempts to restore peasant prosperity -- Analyst]

Once this was decided, the way was open for the establishment 642
of the First Five Year Plan which was frankly drawn up so entirely 631
in the central offices that the local Commissariats of the different republics ceased to have their former significance in the state and became, for the most part, mere subsidiaries to be watched and checked at every turn or at every manifestation of a tendency toward independence.

There was no longer any talk of the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic with its powers to maintain diplomatic representatives abroad or with the pretense that it was handling its own affairs under the guidance of the All-Union Communist Party. The role of the Russian element in the state kept on increasing and once more it was possible to revive the old arguments as to the need for definite russification.

It was relatively a simple matter for the government to administer industry as it wished. It had retained control throughout [475]●
the period of the New Economic Policy of the leading factories and industrial enterprises and the workers had been deprived of any of the rights which they might have imagined themselves possessed when they took over the plants. They were by now completely dependent for their conditions of work and for their employment on the whims of the plant managers who were themselves directly under the central authorities in Moscow. The government built new plants where and as it wished and was not bound to consult any one as to its purposes and measures.

The peasants were less tractable, for especially in Ukraine 423
they still felt themselves the masters of their own fate. The new 474
philosophy looked upon them, too, as the servants of the state and 661
determined to collectivize them in one way or another and to force 425
them into collective farms, whether they wished it or not.

In this process the first step was to break the peasant power of resistance and the regime saw clearly that this was based upon the financial power of the richer and the middle peasants. Whereas Lenin and the earlier Soviet regime in Ukraine had grouped together the middle and the poor peasants and had supported them against the richer peasants and the large landowners, the

[1927- Stalin made Party and Government synonymous -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1



planation is, of course, that a vast number of city dwellers were Russified Ukrainians. Naturally enough, the nationalist leaders felt that no secure basis for their program could exist as long as the municipalities of the country were islands of foreign culture.

Within the urban group, nationalist efforts and nationalist sentiment were largely concentrated in one social stratum. Nationalist movements throughout the world have usually been the work of the middle class. Since there had been no East Ukrainian capitalist middle class of any significance before 1920, and since there was no possibility that one could arise under Soviet conditions, except for a few traders carrying on a precarious business under the NEP, a commercial class continued to be lacking. The counterpart to private commercial enterprise which existed under the Soviet regime, the state trading system, was apparently largely operated by Jews and other non-Ukrainian elements.[2] Unfavorable appraisals of the activity of this system, plus distasteful memories of the "profit-and-run" techniques of the nepmen had produced an unattractive image of the private businessman in the minds of most East Ukrainians.[3] Although, under German occupation, a few gestures were made by some city administrations toward encouraging individual enterprise, the chief factors in production and distribution, insofar as the appalling economic conditions made such activities possible at all, were public and

nationalist movements endeavor to claim as large a proportion as possible of the inhabitants of a disputed area as members of their national group in origin and attitude. It must be remembered, however, that the OUN, and some other Ukrainian nationalist groups, were not democratic in ideology; hence the wishes of a majority at a particular time were of little importance in their eyes. Rather, this failure to possess the adherence of the inhabitants of an area which they regarded as theirs through the "rights" of history and blood served as an additional proof of the iniquities of the Soviet regime and of Russians in general and as a stimulus to more strenuous efforts to "correct" the situation.

[2] Some Ukrainians today (Interview 35) state that many wartime ascriptions of all the evils of the Soviet system to the Jews were highly exaggerated, in most cases a forced concession to Nazi racism, but insist that there was a good deal of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine because Jews predominated in retail distribution, and in the conditions of extreme shortage used their positions for selfish purposes. In view of the occupations of most Jews before the Revolution, their numerical predominance in the state distributive system is probably a fact, and it is fairly obvious that any recognizably alien group in such a position would be resented when they could not satisfy the consumers' wants, whether or not peculation played a role in their activities.

[3] Interview 65.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1



[475] 565 cooperative enterprises. Hence the development of a middle class on the traditional Western model did not take place.

Actually, in the Ukraine, as in many other countries in which 517 nationalist movements have developed, it was other components 186 of the middle class which played the leading role. These were the intellectuals, the professionals, and the bureaucrats, together with the student body from which they were recruited. All four of these categories, together with a vast number of persons who would in Western usage be classified simply as clerks, technicians, or even custodial personnel, are lumped together in Soviet classifications as "intelligentsia"—i.e., all whose work does not involve a large measure of manual labor.[4] The leaders of the nationalist movements came from a narrower stratum however. The majority of this leadership consisted of intellectuals par excellence; that is, it was drawn from the academic or literary profession.

This crucial statement requires some proof, which is difficult to present in the absence of statistics or the possibility of sampling, both of which are unavailable for obvious reasons. However, the preponderance of intellectuals is indicated indirectly by figures previously cited on the extremely high proportion of persons with higher or secondary education employed in the Kiev city and *raion* administrations in 1942,[5] and by the statements from well-informed participants that these and other administrations, as well as editorial staffs, served as refuges for intellectuals displaced from their normal occupations.[6] Furthermore, the efforts of nationalist groups, whether OUN or local, were directed very largely toward assisting and encouraging the teachers and writers, a factor which suggests that they were closely tied to these segments of the population. For example, Mel'nyk organizers in Kiev in the winter of 1941–42 made special efforts to secure work in the cooperatives for teachers in order to enable them to avoid forced labor for the rebuilding of bridges.[7] Similarly, the strong

[4] For a discussion of the concept in Soviet usage, see Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), pp. 324 ff.

[5] See Chapter IX.

[6] See Chapter V.

[7] Iurko Stepovyi, *Syn Zakarpattia: Ukraïns'ke revoliutsiine pidpillia v Kyievi 1941–1942 r.* (A Son of Transcarpathia: The Ukrainian Revolutionary Underground in Kiev 1941–42) (Munich, 1947), p. 16. According to one account, the Red Cross in Kiev also aided the intelligentsia (along with prisoners of war) to a special degree (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, December 4, 1942, p. 2).

474 find work in the villages. All able-bodied men and women and also young people are required to cooperate in the kolhosp. These forces are divided into so-called work brigades. Thus there is a brigade for field work, another for the grooming of horses, a third for cattle-raising and dairy farming. The farmer has turned into "comrade fieldworker", the hired man into "comrade groom", and the servant girl into "comrade milkmaid". The brigades are divided up into "lanky" (links of a chain). Since the entire system of co-owners gives ample opportunity to shirk and to blame others for one's negligence, individual "links" are now given the entire cultivation of one section of a field, from ploughing to harvesting. In this way one has, quite unintentionally, gone back more or less to the old order in which the individual farm cultivated its land in a similar manner.

The Bolshevik village community has many shortcomings. Love of work and productivity are negligible, for individual industry scarcely effects the amount of wages. But peasant industriousness cannot be dissociated from a good harvest. Therefore, efforts have been made in recent times to spur on Comrade "farm worker" by means of prizes. Distant Moscow determines the plan for sowing; the political board appoints the supervisor of the farm, although according to the statute he should be elected by the members of the kolhosp. A
475 further source of constant trouble, constant bungl-
474 ing and therefore irrevocable losses are the "machine-tractor stations" (MTS). It was precisely with these state organizations for /154/ agricultural machines that Moscow intended to remove all difficulties in the process of modernizing agriculture. Thus the kolhosp were ordered to deliver all their agricultural machinery there. The MTS were to keep it in order and at the same time constantly enlarge their stock of machines by the purchase of new tractors, ploughs, harrows, mowing

475 machines and threshing machines. At the time of
474 sowing and reaping the MTS with all their machines were to be at the disposal of the kolhosp.

474 Let us now imagine a large estate without draft animals and without machines. Before planting time messengers must be sent to a station that is perhaps 40 to 50 kilometers distant, with the request that machines be sent on a certain day for plowing and sowing and in fall for mowing and threshing. After long months of rest the machines of the central station were suddenly supposed to be in all villages at once. The unreliability of this arrangement is even more evident when climatic conditions demand the quickest possible execution of sowing and reaping. Within a few days the sprouting of the new seed can become decisive. The kernel can be laid into the black earth only when the rich humus is dry enough so that wagons and horses can drive over the field roads without getting stuck. But sowing must take place before the warm wind has dried out the ground. Again, at harvest time, one must take advantage of the proper moment. The grain must be sufficiently ripe but not over-ripe, otherwise it will drop out of the ears. This is the time when the German farmer goes to the field every day in order to test the ripeness of his grain. In the collective farm the idea is to be more progressive. There the agronomic supervisor of the distant MTS knows exactly when the grain at kolhosp XY has reached the proper firmness and when he can send forth his tractors and harvesters.

475 In 1935 there were 873 machine-tractor-stations in the entire Soviet Ukraine. In 1936 it was estimated that each /155/ MTS had 70 tractors, 16 mowing-threshing machines, 50 threshing machines, 15 traction engines, 15 motors and a crew of 400 men. The supervision of an MTS consists of a technical director, his political representative, a supervising agronomist - there

475 are eight agronomists all together working at an MTS - , the chief bookkeeper and the leading mechanic. These five comrades are the actual lords of the kolhosp of their district. The local leader of a kolhosp is merely the inspector who must follow the directions of the MTS and who all too often has no idea of how to run a farm.

474 475 As to what these large agricultural projects are like in practice, we have the following reports in the Soviet newspapers: The Communist Khar'kov) of January 8, 1939 announces that in the region of Dniepropetrovsk 82,211 doppelzentner of seed grain are lacking and that in the Khar'kov region 38.5% of the necessary seed is lacking. Visti (kiyev) of March 28, 1939, under the title of: "Sowing and not waiting for the ground to dry out", published the following report by its regional correspondent in Odessa: "After the bad weather field work has begun in the Odessa region. The sun and wind dry out the soil quickly, and the kolhosp of the southern districts of the region have begun sowing individual crops... The kolhosp of 'Spartakus' district have entered the contest in honor of the Eighteenth Plenary Assembly of the Communist Party, and are carrying on their spring sowing on a large scale. More than 1000 hectares of spring crops have already been sown in the district. Comrade Shlef and Comrade Wakker who run the tractors are performing 150% of the average of work per day. During the noon recess the kolhosp agitators help the members of the kolhosp study and memorize the speech of the leader of peoples, Stalin, delivered at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party....But in spite of the present very favorable weather at present, not all the MTS of the Odessa region are ready to plant. In this region /156/ 112 tractors have not been repaired, 69 of which are caterpillar tractors. At the MTS of Andrei-Ivanov, for example, only one out of six caterpillar tractors is repaired; in the Ianiv MTS only one out of four;

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475 in the Vradiyiv MTS not one of three. As far as the supply of seed grain is concerned, all is not well. As a result of the inactivity and lack of management of the regional office for grain supplies, only 85% of the kolhosp are supplied with select grain. It is incomprehensible why there is a lack of seed grain precisely in those kolhosp that so industriously set about planting. Every day several dozen vehicles drive up to the grain provisioning center of Golovanevsk in order to exchange grain that is unsuitable for planting, and are forced to return without seed grain. In the granary at Golovanevsk there are 2000 doppelzentner of barley which for some reason is not cleaned. The precious spring days are wasted on trips to the elevator...The leaders of those rayons which have in part begun sowing fail to readjust the kolhosp immediately to field work... The MTS are not supplied with fuel quickly enough. As a result of an insufficient supply of fuel field work can come to a standstill even during the first few days of mass sowing. The leaders of the districts and rayons ought to head the contest for a superior Stalin-harvest in honor of the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party, in which the great masses of kolhosp have determined to take part."

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On June 7 and 8, 1939 a meeting of the active committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine was held in Kiyev. Khrushchov, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the KPU stated that the harvest for this year promised to be a very good one, "but in the Bile Pole district only 18 out of 39 mowing-threshing machines were repaired, and the same was true of 19 out of 64 threshing machines and 2 out of 16 hauling machines. The situation in the /157/manufacture of sugar beets is alarming. The Odessa factory 'The Red

474 Signal' did not...deliver 100 threshing machines.
475 In the Chernigov region 70% of the necessary machine rakes are lacking; there is also a great lack of scythes... It is necessary to train 4000 persons in the handling of mowing-threshing machines, but the proper courses have not yet been organized..."

The "Sotsialistychna Zemlia" Number 114, 1939 complains: "Many kolhosp have no bags. The Storehouses in which the grain is to be kept are not rain-proof. In many kolhosp the repair of agricultural implements had to be suspended and in many others it could not even be begun because of the lack of forge coal. The shops have neither harnesses nor tar nor wagon-grease. In the region of Zhitomir only 160 out of 544 threshing machines were put into working order, and the same was true of only 143 out of 1475 motors." From the report of the representative of the Dnepropetrovsk region, Zadyonchenko, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, "Izvestiia" of April 6, 1939 says that in 3000 kolhosp there are only 195 Communist organizations; that there were 8 repair shops for 66 MTS, which did not suffice to repair all broken-down tractors. We could fill a book with similar complaints taken from the Soviet press.

The beneficiary of the kolhosp is first of all the Muscovite state that takes as its share up to 25% of the estimated yield at a ridiculously low price. The MTS are paid in kind for their services. Of the rest of the harvest yield the seed grain and animal fodder are segregated and about 10 to 15% of the harvest is set aside as iron reserves, - before the First World War the cautious farmer always stored up the yield of an
474 entire harvest. Finally, the members of the kolhosp receive a certain annual share of provisions, aside from current provisions; what is left over is divided up in proportion to the number of days that have been worked. For some time now an

11: Obermaier--185 J-3(no date)1942 RD1UkraineRD1

•45 where the state regulates everything, there is no longer any room for self-maintenance. State commerce is supervised by the various commissariats, which fact does not facilitate its smooth running. The commissariats for internal commerce, for the food industry, for local industry, the "Division for the Welfare of Workers" and other offices also have a voice. In 1935 there were 310,300 workers employed "in the service of Ukrainian commerce". Of this crew the Jews represented 42.8% and the Ukrainians 38.1%. (118)

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118: Soviet Trade, Kiyev 1937.

/171/ The Soviet press sometimes tells tales out of school about how Soviet business has developed under the leadership of the Jews who reputedly have a talent for business. Pravda of November 16, 1936, writes of a "fantastic flood of rules and regulations". During the first nine months of 1936, they said, the people's commissar Weizer issued 42,000 orders, decrees and resolutions. Izvestiia of March 14, 1937 writes: "In Rostov on the Don the demand for light articles of clothing is great, but the shops are empty. Summer clothing, suits, underwear, sport clothes, bathing suits, there is nothing of this kind in the fifty-nine shops of the city. There is unbelievable disorder in supplies." On the subject of profiteering Pravda reports on May 25, 1937: "In 1936 deficits, embezzlements and divestments amounted to an enormous sum: in government business 217 million rubles, in the consumer cooperatives 203 million rubles. But these represent only the deficits and embezzlements that were discovered!" Za Industriializatsii of July 17, 1937, gives an interesting glimpse into how the Donets region is supplied with food. "In the regulation of April 29 of this year," writes the periodical, "the council of the people's commis-

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# CONSTITUTION

(Fundamental Law)

of the

UKRAINIAN

SOVIET SOCIALIST

REPUBLIC

of January 30, 1937

As amended through November 21, 1949

## Chapter I. The Social Structure

642 Art. 1. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic is a socialist state of workers and peasants.

Art. 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies which grew and attained strength as a result of the overthrow of the power of the landlords and capitalists, the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liberation of the Ukrainian people from national oppression by Tsarism and by the Russian imperialist bourgeoisie and the defeat of the nationalist counter-revolution constitute the political foundation of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 3. In the Ukrainian SSR all power belongs to the working people of town and country as represented by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

471 Art. 4. The economic foundation of the Ukrainian SSR is the socialist system of economy and the socialist ownership of the means and instruments of production established as the result of the abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the abrogation of private ownership of the means and instruments of production and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Art. 5. Socialist property in the Ukrainian SSR exists either in the form of State property (the possession of the whole people), or in the form of co-operative and collective farm property (the possession of collective farms or co-operative associations).

475 421 Art. 6. The land, its natural deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water and air transport, banks, communications, large State-organized agricultural enterprises (State farms, machine and tractor stations and the like), as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk of houses in the cities and industrial localities, are State property, that is belong to the whole people.

474 421 Art. 7. The common enterprises of collective farms and co-operative organizations with their livestock and implements, and the products of the collective farms and co-operative organizations, as well as their common buildings, constitute the common, socialist property of collective farms and co-operative organizations.

In addition to its basic income from the common collective farm enterprise, every household in a collective farm has for its personal use a small plot of household land and, as its personal property, a subsidiary husbandry on the plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor agricultural implements — in accordance with the regulations of the agricultural artel.

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727 Industry is to be revived; railroads and other forms of
433 transport are to be rebuilt; the mining of coal is to regain and then to outstrip the pre-war output; the production of machinery and equipment for both light and heavy industry is to be restored; and to do this, iron and steel production is to be increased until it surpasses pre-war. War damaged power stations are to be rehabilitated, and additional ones are to be constructed, particularly in smaller communities.

[185] Altogether the output of industrial enterprises in the Ukrainian S.S.R. in 1950 is envisaged at 9,200 million roubles, of which the output of state industries under local jurisdiction and of industrial co-operatives is estimated to comprise 3,100 million roubles[1].

The volume of industrial production in the whole U.S.S.R. in 1950 - that is, the last year of the Five-Year Plan - is fixed at 205,000 million roubles (in 1926-27 prices). Compared with 138,500 million roubles in 1940, this represents an increase in industrial output of 48 per cent.

727 Particular stress in the Five-Year Plan is laid on the development
433 of the Western Ukraine and the Transcarpathian Region. Lvov, the main
361 city of the Western Ukraine, is to be developed into a major industrial centre, where there are to be built and put into operation an automobile assembly plant, electrical, telephone, and telegraph-equipment manufacturing plants, a glass works, a knitting mill, and food processing plants.

In the Transcarpathian Region, new light industry plants are to be constructed, and the mining of brown coal (lignite) is to be organized and extended. Provision is to be made for the rehabilitation and development of the woodworking and wood chemical industries and of farming,
[652] particularly fruit-growing, viticulture, livestock breeding and apiculture, as well as of the food processing industries. The farms of the Transcarpathian Region are to be given considerable state assistance in the form of agricultural machines, fertilizers, and credits.

000 A more detailed discussion of the Five-Year Plan in connection with farming and the various industries follows in later sections of this report.

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[475] It must be remembered that a number of enterprises although situated in the Ukrainian Republic are not under the Republic's jurisdiction, but under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Union Government.

311 241 [407] [475] Despite a certain reduction in the area under cultivation in the Ukraine, (25,124,900 hectares in 1937 as compared with 26,438,400 in 1932), production rose considerably, reflecting great progress in the mechanization of agriculture. The number of tractors increased from 51,300 in 1932 to 83,900 in 1937. The number of harvesting combines increased in the same period from 4,900 to 26,700. The number of Machine and Tractor Stations grew from 657 to 958. The mechanization of agriculture in the Ukrainian S.S.R. is shown in the following table, which compares the output of energy from draught animals with the energy derived from machines, both in the Ukrainian Republic and in the entire Soviet Union. (It should be noted that, according to Soviet practice, the output of energy is measured in kilowatt hours.)

TABLE V

Output of Energy in Agriculture, 1938
(million kwh)

| | Ukrainian S.S.R. | Total Soviet Union |
|---|---|---|
| [407] Energy from machines | 4,211 | 19,304.2 |
| 379 Energy from draught cattle | 1,662 | 14,667.5 |
| Total output of energy in agriculture | 5,873 | 33,971.7 |

Source : Planned Economy XII, Moscow, 1940.

[178] As the table shows, the percentage of mechanization in the Ukraine was greater than in the entire Soviet Union.

## Agricultural Development of the Incorporated Territories

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725 According to the Concise Yearbook of Poland, London, 1941, there were in 1938 over four million hectares of arable land and 190,000 hectares of orchards and market gardens in Western Ukraine. The principal crops grown were wheat, rye, barley, oats, potatoes, and sugar beet.

Before 1939 farming in Western Ukraine was carried out on a very primitive level. After the incorporation of this region into the Ukrainian Republic, however, great changes were made. On October 28, 1939, the People's Assembly of Western Ukraine decreed the confiscation of large land estates, and subsequently, according to the Moscow periodical, Soviet State and Law (1941-III), over one million hectares were distributed among 400,000 landless farm workers and small holders. Similar changes occurred in the other incorporated territories. In the northern part of Bukovina, (in the Chernovitsy Province joined to the Ukraine) 200,000 hectares were distributed among landless workers, while in the Izmail (former Akkerman) Province, Bessarabia, 65,000 hectares were divided.

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178 Apart from the confiscation of large estates and the re-distribution of the land, two further processes could be observed in these areas from the time of their incorporation until Germany attacked the U.S.S.R.: the organization of peasant holdings into collective farms, and the increased mechanization of agriculture. By September 1940 there were 400 collective farms in Western Ukraine; by January 1, 1941, the number had increased to 571, in which there were organized 34,000 peasant farm holdings. (These numbers do not include 535 "initiative" groups for the creation of collective farms with 14,000 peasant farm holdings.) In Northern Bukovina (according to the same source Soviet State and Law, 1941-III) the first seven collective farms with 3,000 hectares were also founded.

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407 Mechanization also advanced rapidly. In the western part of the Ukraine 170 Machine and Tractor Stations were established in the first year of incorporation into the Republic. In 1941 in the Izmail Province, 27 Machine Tractor Stations were being built, and in the Chernovitsy Province, 13.

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407
652 In the Transcarpathian region (incorporated into the Ukraine in June, 1945), nine Machine and Tractor Stations were established in 1946 to assist the work of the fields. The Five-Year Plan 1946-50 provides for special attention to the farms of Transcarpathian Ukraine in the form of machines, fertilizers and credits to increase agricultural production in this region, the pre-war output of which was as follows.